Innovative solutions to sanitation problems in urban slums. Pune, India
The SHWAAS project is an initiative by CHF India, a non-profit organization active for over 11 years, dedicated to improving sanitation conditions in poor urban communities in India. Specifically, the project was launched in May 2012 in Pune, one of the major cities in Maharashtra, with the aim of addressing the severe problems related to access to sanitation services in urban slums. SHWAAS was funded with 1 million euros by the European Commission and partnered with the Pune Municipal Corporation (PMC), the government body responsible for managing public services in the city.
Context and motivations behind the project
In India, both urban and rural poor communities face enormous difficulties in accessing basic sanitation services. This issue is particularly acute in slums, informal settlements characterized by a chronic lack of infrastructure. Even where public sanitation facilities exist, they are often inadequately maintained, contributing to poor sanitary conditions with serious repercussions on public health.
SHWAAS was created with the aim of improving access to sanitation services in the urban poor communities of Pune and empowering residents to take charge of the management and maintenance of sanitation facilities. CHF India worked closely with the PMC, which was responsible for constructing community toilet blocks, while CHF focused on community mobilization and capacity building.
Project goals and strategies
The SHWAAS project had three main objectives: building and renovating sanitation facilities, mobilizing the local community, and enhancing the capacities of both residents and local authorities.
1. Construction and renovation: The goal was to improve sanitation infrastructure in 100 slums in Pune. The PMC was responsible for constructing the facilities, while CHF led the community engagement process. However, construction proved particularly problematic due to bureaucratic delays and management issues. Residents and social workers could report faults or maintenance requests, but solutions were often slow to come. By the end of the project, only 25% of the funds earmarked for the construction and maintenance of sanitation facilities had been utilized.
2. Community mobilization: Another key aspect of the project was active community involvement. CHF believed that long-term sustainability of sanitation interventions could only be guaranteed if slum residents actively participated in the creation and management of the facilities. For this reason, CHF social workers worked to create “Shwaas Samities,” health committees composed of 6-10 members. However, at first, residents were reluctant to participate, given PMC’s reputation for initiating projects that were not fully completed. Through ongoing dialogue with slum leaders, CHF managed to reduce this reluctance and promote community participation.
3. Capacity building: CHF organized workshops for PMC officials and Shwaas Samity members to raise awareness of the sanitation issues faced by slum residents daily. The idea was that a better understanding of local needs by public authorities could facilitate the resolution of sanitation issues and improve the management of the facilities.
Project outcomes and challenges
While SHWAAS led to some improvements, the project faced significant obstacles, particularly due to PMC’s bureaucratic inefficiencies and the local government’s limited capacity to respond quickly to residents’ needs. By the end of the project, about half of the Shwaas Samities were able to continue the activities independently, but long-term success will largely depend on PMC’s commitment to maintaining and managing the sanitation facilities.
Community involvement was one of the project’s most positive aspects. CHF worked with local leaders and social workers to raise awareness among residents about the impacts of poor hygiene and to promote a sense of collective responsibility in managing infrastructure. However, the community-based approach, which required strong collaboration between residents and public authorities, was not successfully implemented in all areas involved. In many cases, residents continued to rely on local authorities to resolve sanitation issues, and their requests often went unaddressed.
Governance and participation elements
The project followed a multi-stakeholder approach, involving three of the five actors in the quintuple helix: citizens, NGOs, and public authorities. CHF India collaborated with other local NGOs, such as SWaCH, which specializes in waste management, to support the health committees in the slums. Slum residents were involved from the start of the project, participating in numerous meetings with public authorities to discuss the sanitation problems in their communities. The PMC, though formally involved, often encountered bureaucratic difficulties that slowed down its effectiveness.
Social and economic pooling
Another key principle of the project was “social and economic pooling,” which encouraged collective responsibility in managing sanitation services. Although SHWAAS aimed to transfer infrastructure management to residents, in practice, this transition did not fully occur, as the local government remained the primary provider of sanitation services. Nevertheless, CHF and local NGOs succeeded in promoting greater awareness of sanitation issues within communities, fostering active resident involvement.
Conclusions and future prospects
The SHWAAS project represented an important step towards improving access to sanitation services in Pune’s slums. Community involvement, collaboration with local NGOs, and funding from the European Commission made it possible to implement tangible interventions in nearly 100 communities. However, the project revealed its limitations, primarily related to local bureaucracy and the lack of innovations. The future of the progress made will depend on the local government’s ability to continue supporting the initiatives started and ensuring the effective management of sanitation infrastructure.
The Fujisawa Sustainable Smart Town (FSST) project was initiated by Panasonic Corporation to develop a sustainable and technologically advanced residential community, addressing the needs of the Japanese market with an aging population and a declining electronics market. Started in 2012, following the closure of a 19-hectare industrial complex in Fujisawa in 2008, FSST saw its first residents move in by 2014. By 2018, 600 smart houses and 400 small apartments had been completed.
The “Fujisawa Model” reverses the traditional smart city approach, focusing on residents’ lifestyles in terms of energy, mobility, and wellness. Key project goals include reducing CO2 emissions by 70% compared to 1990, reducing water consumption by 30% compared to 2006, and sourcing at least 30% of total energy consumption from renewable sources. FSST also aims to maintain urban life during severe natural disasters.
To achieve these goals, five main services and projects were identified:
1. Energy: Use of renewable sources and advanced technologies for energy management and generation.
2. Security: Creation of a “virtually fenced city” with monitoring.
3. Mobility: Promotion of car-free mobility with sharing services and charging points for electric vehicles.
4. Wellness: Support for healthy lifestyles with health information, urban gardens, and sports facilities.
5. Community: Creation of a cohesive social community with digital and non-digital solutions.
Project governance is managed by three main bodies: the FSST Council, responsible for strategic and financial matters; the FSST Management Company, which handles operational activities; and the SST Committee, which includes residents and serves as a forum for co-creation and feedback.
In summary, FSST is an innovative example of integrating advanced technologies and sustainability to create a resilient and cohesive urban community, addressing contemporary Japan’s economic and social challenges.
Theoretical Framework of Co-Cities and Research Question
3.1 Theoretical Framework of Co-Cities
The co-cities framework is inspired by Elinor Ostrom’s concept of commons, adapted to the urban context. Ostrom demonstrated that communities could sustainably manage commons, characterized by rivalry and non-excludability, through eight key principles and a polycentric governance involving various independent governmental entities. A common good is defined as a shared resource institutionally managed by community members.
The co-cities concept is based on five design principles:
1. Collective Governance: Presence or absence of community-organized governance institutions.
2. Enabling State: The state’s role as a facilitator of collective action.
3. Social and Economic Pooling: Forms of economic pooling.
4. Experimentation: Adaptive and iterative institutional design.
5. Technological Justice: Access to technology and digital infrastructure to facilitate collaboration.
Analysis of Design Principles
Collective Governance of FSST
The Fujisawa Sustainable Smart Town (FSST) project aims to create a smart and sustainable city, predominantly driven by Panasonic with minimal participation from community groups and public authorities. Panasonic has invested about $580 million and maintains a predominant role in strategic decisions. The community was selected based on high financial capacity, with residents having little influence over strategic decisions. Public authorities had a limited, primarily advisory role, and the project is entirely financed by Panasonic. Project governance is heavily skewed towards private interests, with little public and community representation.
Social and Economic Pooling
In FSST, the sharing economy leans more towards access than social and economic pooling. Renewable energy storage batteries are shared operationally, without common ownership. Car sharing and bike sharing services are available for a fee, reflecting a weak sharing economy. Additionally, there is a resident assistance platform based on non-monetized mutual support rather than direct economic transactions.
Enabling State
The enabling state in FSST plays a marginal role, providing general conditions rather than active participation in governance. Japanese government policies support smart cities as part of economic renewal strategy, but direct state intervention is limited.
Experimentation
FSST stands out for its experimentation, characterized by a clear model and framework, implementation strategies, and various innovative projects. While this approach is replicable in similar contexts, it is limited by Japan’s unique context and a focus on specific goals rather than managing urban commons.
Technological Justice
Regarding technological justice, FSST ensures equitable access to digital services for all residents, without evident digital divides due to widespread technology adoption. However, the digital infrastructure is exclusively owned by Panasonic, not the community, limiting the degree of technological justice.
Conclusion
The Fujisawa Sustainable Smart Town (FSST) project raises concerns about urban commons management, highlighting a private sector-dominated smart city model. The FSST case analysis suggests the project focuses on monetizing shared resources, favoring a “new urbanism” characterized by individualization and reduced collective actions, as described by David Harvey. The city favors privatized access to resources, supported by a wealthy demographic and lacking open discussions on social inequality. The “virtually fenced city” emphasizes security at the expense of diversity and public participation.
Scholars like Ranchordás emphasize that without strong public oversight, smart cities become more corporatized, outsourcing public tasks and neglecting social rights and political citizenship. An example is Alphabet’s project in Toronto, where corporations control urban planning and data, limiting city autonomy. In contrast, Barcelona represents a positive model with its ethical digital standards and promotion of collective well-being.
The FSST case demonstrates that corporate dominance can limit inclusive and sustainable policies in smart cities. It is essential to balance corporate power with public involvement to meet collective needs and promote social and economic well-being. The future of smart cities must be guided by an integrated vision, avoiding paths that prioritize private economic interests over the community.
Check out the review of the Co-Cities Book by Sheila Foster and Christian Iaione (The MIT Press) in the Journal of Design and Culture (Taylor & Francis) by Jacob DeGeal.
“While the authors do warn us of the effects of planet-destroying dystopias of late-stage capitalism and labyrinthian bureaucracies mired in their own processes, they do not fall prey to polemic narratives or bias. They remain hopeful, inspirational, and studious, acknowledging the necessary participation of these power-wielding institutions. By establishing the city as commons, monolithic power structures can be systemically reduced and balanced with the needs and wishes of community members. Co-Cities provides a realistic path forward for communities to apply human-focused collaborative action to their own neighborhoods, and optimize governmental buy-in.”
This case study on village co-governance in China reveals a very interesting opposite co-governance typology by different village leaders concerning the management of village land use. Management of village land is one of the old if not the oldest practice of co-governance at the village level which was done through the use of social norms before the promulgation of legal rules. Conflict arises when long-term social practices are inconsistent with the laws which oftentimes results in tension between the two systems of control.
Based on the Chinese land reform regime, urban lands are said to be state-owned while rural lands are collectively owned. The development of rural lands and transfer even though collectively or privately owned needs approval from the government. This legal reform received widespread protest and condemnation, especially from Chinese farmers who considered the system as a government land grab or monopoly. As such, Chinese farmers began to construct illegal housing for rent to show their deviance from the system.
According to the Chinese Ministry of Land and Resources, by 2007, Chinese farmers had built over 6.6 billion square meters of houses in evasion of the legal prohibition on private rural land development and transfer, resulting in a huge market of illegal houses. The construction of these illegal houses in China later became known as the “small property houses” business which was very profitable at the time and became very popular among villagers. The management of the collectively owned rural lands is carried out by the village co-op members who are selected by the villagers to run the affairs of the villages and in particular manage the village land. These village co-op members serve as the middlemen between the central government and the villagers.
In essence, the case study talks about the village co-op members (W village) that use mafia-style leadership to manage the village land while the other village co-op (Z village) follows the law to manage the village land. A detailed discussion of these two village co-op management is given below with a concluding remark on the case study.
W village:The mafia-style small property business
W village used to be an example of a very good co-governance or commons system that paved the way for the establishment of village co-ops in other villages in Shenzhen. The village co-op board is a form of collective economic organization responsible for the management of collectively owned lands that are not allocated to individual households and for issuing dividends to villagers each year based on the profits generated from the management of the lands. They used this collectively owned land to build factories and rent them to outsider investors.
The small property business became booming and very profitable within a very short period hence it gave rise to the establishment of a mafia organization in W village and Shajing sub-district in general. This mafia organization became a partnership between corrupt government officials, village co-op leaders, and the mafia. The mafia organization was illegally buying the collectively owned lands from the village co-ops at low prices and reselling them at more expensive prices. The co-op boards in return relied on the mafia to deal with corrupt government officials and guarantee their re-election after every three-year mandate in office thus the mafia influences village elections and grassroots government operations.
As a consequence of the village co-op leadership style in W village, the payment of dividends to villagers came to a halt since the village co-op was no longer making a profit. Again, the village co-op would use the mafia to silence villagers from making any noise for failure to pay dividends through violence. Sadly, W village ended up in a chaotic situation and lost the opportunity for the village redevelopment project from the government because of too many squatters.
Z village: In the name of law
Just like the case in W village, Z village is also into the small property business in which villagers were building houses on their privately owned lands and renting to migrant workers. Before the government’s full prohibition, the village co-op also built several factories on the collectively owned lands and rented them to investors. However, the difference between the two is that W village was disobedient to the established laws for the management and transfer of collectively owned lands while Z village was obedient to the established laws by challenging the meaning and the interpretation of these laws to develop their land.
There is a lot of conflict among the laws in China for the management and development of lands, for instance, the Chinese Land Administration Law “Prohibits rural land transfer and development”, while the Chinese Constitution and Land Administration Law on land ownership states that “urban land is state-owned; rural land is collective-owned”. These conflicts between the laws coupled with the high cost and hefty procedures to follow to acquire approval from the government make it difficult for some village co-ops to follow the laws for the management and development of rural lands in China.
Fortunately, Z Village later came under the leadership of an ex-real estate guru who was committed to stopping the chaotic housing construction by his villagers and began to apply for legal rights from the government to redevelop Z Village. The first thing done by the new leadership was to build a park of 40,000 square meters. The village co-ops began to redirect their focus on the village environment rather than building more buildings following which house rents were increased and the annual dividends due to the villagers rose to an average yearly increment of 10%. Based on the foregoing, the new leadership was able to persuade villagers to give up on their illegally constructed houses and apply for a village redevelopment project from the government which was successful and villagers held legal rights on their individual properties.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this case study tells a story of co-governance or management of commons at the village level which as a matter of fact can also be extended to the cities and urban settlements. Co-governance requires not focusing on short-term economic benefits driven by the resources of the commons but rather should be focused on sustainable practices to maintain and manage the resources accordingly.
In the first case, short-term economic benefit superseded the collective future interest of the village and as a result, ended up in a chaotic situation and the village became ungovernable. The second case focuses on the long-term interest of all the villagers and maximizes the immediate economic benefit to create profit in the future for the village. Co-governance although considered as self-governance cannot be successful without the involvement of legal rules. It must follow established laid-down laws to achieve the goals of the common good and interest of all.
Each year, the The American Energy Society spotlights the most extraordinary contributions to energy and sustainability.
We are thrilled to announce that among the winners of the Energy Awards 2023 is the book “Co-Cities: Innovative Transitions toward Just and Self-Sustaining Communities” (The MIT Press), by Sheila Foster and Christian Iaione, awarded in the category of Best Book about the ‘Commons’.
